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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ; 
vs. ; 
RAYMOND J. VIGIL, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
Case No, 900147-CA 
i Priority 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to the provision of Rule 3, 
Title II, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in which 
Defendant-Appellant appeals his conviction from the District Court, 
Second Judicial District, Davis County, State of Utah. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an Appeal from a criminal conviction in which 
Defendant-Appellant was convicted of (1) Burglary, a felony of the 
second degree, in that he is alleged to have entered into a dwelling 
with intent to commit a theft and (2) Habitual Criminal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the officer have reasonable grounds or suspicion to 
follow Defendant's car and make an investigative stop? 
2. Was the arrest of the Defendant and all other occupants 
of the auto proper or was it a pretext to impound the car? 
3. Was the owner's consent to search the vehicle freely 
and voluntarily given. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The following statute is determinative in this case: 
United States Constitution, arcvend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches 'and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant was charged with Burglary of a dwelling, 
a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
76-6-202. Defendant moved to suppress evidence which was denied. 
Defendant was convicted by jury trial conducted on April 19, 1989 
before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District Judge. Defendant 
was then tried by jury under the Habitual Criminal Statute, Utah 
Code Annotated, Sec. 76-8-1001 and determined to be a habitual 
criminal. Judge Cornaby sentenced Defendant to the Utah State 
Prison for a term of five years to life. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant, Raymond J. Vigil (hereinafter referred 
to as Vigil) was one of two passengers in an automobile driven by 
his juvenile nephew. All occupants of the car are Hispanic. A 
Police Officer saw the three Hispanic males in an affluent area of 
Bountiful, Utah and became suspicious. The officer had no knowledge 
of a burglary having been committed or any other criminal act on the 
part of the vehicle occupants. The officer followed the car for a 
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substantial distance when he stopped the driver for speeding 45 mph 
in a 35 mph zone. When the car was stopped, the driver was cited 
for speeding and open container. All three occupants of the car 
were arrested and transported to jail and the car impounded for 
normally citation only type of cases. The owner of the automobile 
(mother of the driver) contacted the police later that evening. She 
requested information of her automobile. The arresting officer 
implied that the car must be searched before being released to her. 
She gives a guarded consent. The car is searched without a warrant 
and items from a burglary are found in the car. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The police officer followed the 
automobile in which Defendant was a passenger solely because there 
were three Hispanic occupants in an auto in East Bountiful. The 
speeding citation was a pretext resulting from the officers trailing 
Defendant in excess of 23 blocks within Bountiful City. The officer 
arrested the driver and two passengers for speeding and open 
container violations, thereby necessitating impoundment of the 
vehicle. The subsequent warrantless search is without free and 
voluntary consent and is illegal. The items confiscated from the 
car trunk is illegally seized evidence which should have been 
suppressed by the trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DID THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
FOLLOW DEFENDANT'S AUTO AND MAKE AN INVESTIGATIVE STOP? 
Defense Counsel Vanderlinden and Prosecutor Harward 
stipulated to the facts of the auto stop by officer Johns. (Tl. 13, 
17, 18) Deputy Johns saw three male Hispanics in an 
automobile traveling in an affluent Bountiful area. He becomes 
suspicious and turns around and follows the car from approximately 
550 South 1100 East, Bountiful to 1130 North 400 East in Bountiful, 
(Tl. 74) a distance of approximately 24 blocks until he determines a 
speed violation. Officer Johns has no knowledge of a burglary or 
any other criminal offense having occurred. 
Based on objective and articulable facts, Officer Johns had 
no basis to document a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
justify an investigatory stop of Defendant's automobile. 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986); Utah Code 
Annotated Sec. 77-7-15 (1982). He followed the vehicle 24 blocks 
obviously on a "hunch", eventually culminating in a speeding 
citation. This Court has clearly set forth the standards which 
govern police officer's actions in circumstances such as the instant 
case. In the easel, State of Utah v. Sigifredo Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972 (Utah App. 1988) this Court addressed a factual circumstance 
similar to the case at bar. In Sierra, this Court adopts the 
Three transcripts have been prepared and each numbered se-
quentially. Therefore the transcript of the suppression hearing 
shall be designated Tl; the trial as T2 and the Habitual Criminal 
transcript as T3 
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Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2582, test of whether 
a stop is a pretext. We must make an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting him at the time to determine the true purpose of the 
stop and search. 
The Trial Court applied this form of test but mistakenly 
found the arresting officer had immediately perceived a speed 
violation (Tl. 35-36) when in fact the officer trailed the car for 
23+ blocks before citing a violation of speed. 
This Court held in Sierra, that 
...in traffic violation stops, in balancing the rights 
of individuals to be free from arbitrary interference 
by law enforcement officers and the government's inte-
rest in crime prevention and public protection, if a 
hypothetical officer would not have stopped the driver 
for the cited traffic offense and the surrounding cir-
cumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is 
unconstitutional. 
This Court further adopted language from the dissent in United 
States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, (D.C. Cir. 1972) which states 
"...very few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without 
violating some traffic regulation." 
The arresting officer followed his hunch based solely on the 
nationality of the occupants of the car in which Defendant was 
riding. No reasons existed to stop the car at the inception of the 
officer's observation. No reasonable officer would have stopped the 
car in a reasonable distance, say 4-5 blocks. All surrounding 
circumstances point to a pretext stop by the arresting officer and 
the ensuing search was unconstitutional. 
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POINT TOO 
THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF THE 
CAR WAS A PRETEXT TO IMPOUND AND THEREBY INVENTORY SEARCH THE CAR. 
The driver of the automobile was charged with speeding 45 
mph in a 35 mph zone and for open container of alcohol in an 
automobile. The Defendant and second passenger were both arrested 
for open container of alcohol. It is very pertinent that at the 
time of arrest, the officer had no other criminal charges or 
specific suspicions about the occupants. Although the police 
officer's determination to arrest individuals for these kinds of 
offenses is discretionary, very rarely is arrest utilized. Giving 
the offenders a citation to appear is the standard practice in Davis 
County, State of Utah. Impounding an auotmobile for speeding and 
open container offenses is clearly unusual and not standard 
practice. The arrest in the case at bar is so out of the ordinary 
that when viewed in the totality of the circumstances (the officer's 
trailing for 23 blocks; the officer's commitment to search the 
trunk; the impound of a car for speeding; the attraction to the car 
because of the occupants' race) it can only be deemed a pretext 
arrest. The arrest was a subterfuge to search the vehicle and the 
search was therefore illegal Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W. 2d 
743, 10 ALR3d 308. 
For a search of an automobile incident to an arrest for a 
traffic citation to be valid, the search must have been conducted 
contemporaneously with the arrest. In the case at tar, the auto in 
which Defendant was a passenger was towed to Dewaal's in Bountiful, 
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Utah. The car was locked in a fenced yard. Given these 
circumstances, a warrantless search is not justified since at this 
point (1) the need to search for weapons is minimal (2) no evidence 
will be destroyed (3) there was no danger of the car being driven 
away. The U.S. Supreme Court held evidence derived from such a 
warrantless search, inadmissable as violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Preston v. United States, 376 
U.S. 364, 11 L.ed. 2d 277, 84 S.Ct. 881. 
The Supreme Court had further consistently ruled that 
automobile searches after arrest for traffic citations must have 
some reasonable relation to the offense for which the arrest was 
made. General exploratory searches made solely to find evidence of 
other wrongdoing are unconstitutional and evidence derived therefrom 
is not admissable United States v. Tate, 209 F.Supp 762; Am Jur, 
Searches & Seizures (1st ed. Sec. 19) 
The officer's actions in the case at bar falls directly in 
this area. The evidence he needs to sustain a conviction for open 
container of alcohol in a vehicle is already in his possession. 
Furthermore, it is irrelevant if additional alcohol were found in 
the locked trunk of an automobile and therefore any search is 
pointless except to find evidence of other wrongdoing. On the issue 
of speeding, no further evidence could possibly be found in the 
trunk that has a relation to the speeding charge. 
POINT THREE 
WAS THE OWNER'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE FREELY AND 
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN? 
-7-
In State v. Sierra, this Court followed the majority view 
that a search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent is valid for 
Fourth Amendment analysis and that "voluntary" consent cannot be the 
result of duress or coercion, express or implied. 
Schnockloth v. Bustamontef 412 U.S.218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041; 36 
L.ed.2d 854. 
In the case at bar, Officer John made telephone contact with 
the owner of the automobile in question, a Sally Salazar. This 
conversation took place after the arrest of Defendant and impound of 
the vehicle. With regards to the issue of voluntariness of consent 
to search, officer John's conversation is defective on two points: 
1. Officer John implies that Mrs. Salazar cannot get her 
car released until he looks through it (Tl.9). 
2. Officer John implies to Mrs. Salazar that he has a 
right to search the car trunk because he has the key but can't do so 
because the key is damaged (Tl.7,8). Officer John further implies 
the purpose of the search is to make sure nothing is missing (Tl.9) 
or to simply "make sure everything is okay" (T1.10). 
Based on Officer John's implied threat that Mrs. Salazar 
will not get her car back without a search and that the search is 
merely for the purpose of insuring nothing is missing is a flagrant 
misrepresentation of the facts and law. Mrs. Salazar's strained 
consent (Tl.9) is not voluntary, is coerced, and is based on 
deliberate misrepresentation of facts by Officer John. 
CONCLUSION 
Officer John has singled out the automobile in which 
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Defendant was a passenger solely because of their nationality. The 
facts of the case indicate the officer was determined to investigate 
the occupants of the car. A speeding charge after 23 blocks of 
tailing can be nothing more than a pretext which is compounded by 
the arrest of all occupants on citation only type offenses. A 
reasonable officer given officer John's knowledge at the time would 
not have taken the action he did. The improper stop, arrest, and 
impoundment should not be cured by the consent obtained from the 
auto owner under misrepresentation and duress by Officer John. All 
evidence obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted this /(? day of/June, 1990. 
^WEPHEN I. ODA, Attorney for 
'Defendant-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, STEPHEN I. ODA, hereby certify that I have nailed four 
(4) true and accurate copies oE the aforegoing Brief of Defendant-
Appellant to the following persons at the following addresses, by 
depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the / ^ ^ day 
of June, 1990: 
SANDRA SJOGREN 
Attorney Generalfs Office 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Stephen I. Oda 
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ADDENDUM 
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"Q And then the car was supposed to stay at 
your house?" 
"A 
"Q 
Bountiful? 
"A 
MQ 
him?" 
"A 
MQ 
"A 
"Q 
"A 
"Q 
ottefir than 
"A 
have that < 
So I was g< 
Yes." 
Do you have any idea why he would be in 
n I 
I have no idea." 
Okay. Who — Who was supposed to be with 
He was supposed to have been by himself." 
He was supposed to be by himself?" 
Yes." 
Virgil wasn't supposed to be with him?" 
Nobody was supposed to be with him." 
Okay. Where's all the keys to the vehicle 
than the...." 
Well, I have okay, the ignition key, I 
Dn there, but the trunk key is messed up. 
5tting it to get fixed 'cause it's bent, 
really damaged." 
MQ 
"A 
So you can't get into the trunk?" 
I can't get into the trunk. And, you 
know, I take back the original key which not really, 
won't even 
"Q % 
"A 
go into the hole to open the trunk." 
So what about the glove box?" 
The glove box is the same key as the 
roam zHickzn Court Reporter 
trunk." 
"Q And it was on the ring; right?" 
"A It was supposed to have been there on the 
ring." 
"Q But it — you can't get it into the trunk 
at all?" 
"A I can't get into the trunk 'cause the 
key's no good." 
"Q Okay." 
"A I left my son — left that key with his 
uncle and that, but you see" (Not audible) "somebody 
else to fix the keys. But I don't know. I haven't 
talked with my brother yet or not." 
"Q But he was supposed to get that key fixed 
for^you, and you don't know whether he's done that or 
not?" 
"A I don't know whether he's done that or 
not. " 
"Q Is it possible that your boy headed out 
with your brother and got the key?" 
"A Umm, I've had — umm, I have no idea. It 
could be possible, though." 
"Q Okay." 
"A When I talked to my son, I was pretty 
angry. I didn't even ask him anything. I just 
town cHicKLn Court Reporter 
wanted to know where — where my car was and what the 
hell was going on." 
"Q Do you know who Armando is?" 
"A I — No, I don't know Armando." 
"Q But you know Virgil?" 
"A Virgil?" 
"Q Uh-huh (affirmative)." 
"A Umm, no, not...." 
"Q Virgil Raymond or Raymond Virgil?" 
"A Raymond Vigil, I do." 
"Q And who is that?" 
"A Umm, he's related, umm, to my friend, to 
•his father." 
"Q Well, we need to look through your car 
before we can let it go. Is that all right with 
you?" 
"A Umm, will I have to be there?" 
"Q No, you don't have to be there. There's 
been a list done on the car. Nothing's going to be 
missing or anything. We just need to look through 
it. But we want to make sure that's all right with 
you. " 
"A Yeah. Yeah, I guess so." 
"& So that is fine with you?" 
"A Uh-huh (affirmative)." 
town s.n Court Reporter 9 
"Q And what was your name?" 
"A My name's Salazar." 
"Q Salazar?" 
"A Uh-huh (affirmative)." 
"Q Okay, and that car does come back to you?" 
"A Yeah. It is my car." 
"Q Okay. What's your current address?" 
"A 334 East 1300 South." 
"Q 1300 South?" 
"A Uh-huh (affirmative)." 
"Q In Salt Lake City?" 
"A Yes." 
"Q And what's your phone number?" 
"A 466-4724." 
"Q Okay. You can give them a call and see if 
they'll release that car to you. And like I said, if 
it's all right, we'll go down and look at it and make 
sure everything's okay." 
"A Umm, you don't have — you don't — you 
don't happen to have" (Not audible) 
"Q You what?" 
"A You don't happen to — " 
"Q The telephone number?" 
"A* The telephone number, yeah." 
"Q 292-8036." 
\OVJYI £7Tic,hz.n Court Reporter 10 
1 which defendant was riding was stopped. It deals 
2 J with the lawfulness of the search of the vehicle and 
seizure of evidence from the vehicle. 
Mr. Vanderlinden and I have had a 
5 I conversation, and I anticipate we'll be able to 
6 stipulate for purposes of the suppression hearing on 
7 some evidence. And if the Court will allow, I'll now 
8 make my best effort to recite the stipulated facts. 
9 The date in question is the 14th of January 
10 1989. The city we are concerned with is Bountiful. 
11 The residence involved was secured by the owner at 
12 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The burglary was 
13 discovered at approximately 4:21 in the afternoon of 
14 the same day. On that day, J.R. John who is a deputy 
15 De^ fis County sheriff paramedic was on duty in the 
16 Bountiful area, had an associate from the sheriff's 
17 department with him. 
18 And at approximately 3:06 p.m. on that 
19 day, he saw the vehicle in question in the same area 
20 of town where the burglarized house is. At that 
21 moment in time, Deputy John knew nothing of the — 
22 had no information whatsoever, and he didn't learn 
23 about a burglary until a substantial time later. 
24 When he*saw the car, there was circumstances that 
25 attracted his attention to it. He is a certified 
3\dly !B%oi»n zHlcizsn Court Reporter 
Court has listened to the tape. I would rather have 
the Court listen to the tape rather than recite what 
Mr. Harward said. 
THE COURT: I have listened to the tape. 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: Thank you- And I submit it 
on that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. HARWARD: Let me look at this motion to see 
if I have recited the facts that would be towards the 
issues. 
Yes, your Honor, it is praying in the 
motion to suppress that there was not a search 
-•warrant for the vehicle. That is true. There was no 
14 j warrants to search the vehicle. And it also is true 
that there was not a warrant to seize the shoes. 
Mr. Vanderlinden? 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: Yes. Carvel, there are a 
couple of facts that should be in evidence if I could 
address the Court. 
I would stipulate if those people were 
called to testify that's what they would testify to, 
your Honor. There are a couple of additional facts 
to be brought in evidence. 
If Officer Johns — I would like the 
Court — It is my understanding the first thing that 
xoujn cHickzn Court Reporter 
called his attention to the vehicle prior to the stop 
was three Hispanic males in the vehicle, and they 
were dressed in a certain way, that they appeared to 
be out of California. Based on that, he turned and 
followed the vehicle. That was the only basis for 
it, because there were three Hispanic males in the 
vehicle. 
THE COURT: You mean in spite of the speed? 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: No. That was before the 
speed. The only reason he originally went after that 
car was three Hispanic males, as he put it, and one 
was dressed — and one was dressed — I don't know 
this word. Well, "cholo," c-h-o-l-o. And he's got 
this in his report. And that's the only reason he 
vjgnt after them. 
Further, the only thing that Mr. Vigil was 
arrested for was an open container of alcoholic 
beverage in a vehicle. Nothing else. And the other 
ones was speeding and an open container. And based 
on those misdemeanors was arrested. The car was 
impounded. Those are the only arrests that were 
made* 
And also the times are critical, your 
Honor.* If the Court could indicate — If Detective 
Gray were called to testify, first of all, he would 
xoixrn cJricksn Court Reporter 
determined other than an open container in the car. 
Based on that, we submit it, your Honor. 
MR. HARWARD: We submit it. 
THE COURT: In ruling on the matter, Irll make 
several observations. What I really need to do is 
rule on each one separately because each one really 
becomes an individual claim. 
First we ought to deal with the stop. Our 
appellate courts have generally said that pretext 
stops will not be acceptable. Sometimes those are 
done. You see a vehicle or a person or persons in a 
vehicle, and you decide to stop them and then you 
VLook for a violation, and you may find a taillight 
out. You may find they had too thin on the tire, 
Hbatever it may be in there. The appellate courts 
say that is just a pretext, and we won't let you use 
that pretext to search a vehicle and make inquiry. 
Now, it does appear that the stipulated 
fact was that Deputy Johns saw the individuals in the 
vehicle, and they were Hispanic and they were dressed 
in California style, and, umm, were in an area of 
Bountiful which was unusual to expect them to be in 
that kind of car. And so he followed them. And, of 
course/ he checked the speed and apparently checked 
the speed immediately and they were in the speed 
xoojn sn Court Reporter 
violation. 
1 Under this kind of situation, umm, it does 
not appear to the Court that it is a pretext stop and 
is in violation he had a right to check for the 
speeding. And it's 10 miles over the speed limit. 
And that is the amount that one would — most 
officers would normally stop and ticket a vehicle for 
speeding. So the fact that there are Hispanic 
persons in the vehicle seemed to make no difference 
at that point in time. So the stop was proper. 
It's also true that normally when there's a 
stop for speeding, it's satisfied with a citation. 
%You have the further violation apparently that each 
of the three in the vehicle, they have open 
containers. They're consuming alcoholic beverages 
which is a separate offense for which sometimes a 
citation is given and sometimes an arrest made. You 
have a juvenile driving the car who has no right to 
use alcohol at all. 
Parties didn't really stipulate to the 
Court what the facts were with regard to how 
intoxicated the parties were except that the State 
argued that because of that they had enough 
intoxicating liquor that the officer couldn't let any 
one of the three drive. 
xoixjrt czHickcn Court Reporter 
(T2. 74) referred to as (Tl. 74) in Brief 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I did, yes, sir. 
Q Did you see a vehicle in that area before 
you stopped it? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q This vehicle eventually stopped. Where did 
you first see it? 
A Approximately 550 South 1100 East, 
Bountiful. 
Q Where was the vehicle when you pulled it to 
a stop? 
A Approximately 1130 North 400 East in 
Bountiful. 
Q What kind of vehicle was it? 
A 1975 Monte Carlo. 
Q I show you — I'm sorry. 
A Maroon in color. 
Q I show you a photograph of the vehicle 
Jmarked for identification as Exhibit 22. In that 
photograph, do you see the same 1975 Monte Carlo that 
(you're talking about? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Does the photograph fairly represent that 
IL975 Monte Carlo, at least as far as the view that is 
Displayed in the photograph is concerned? 
A Yes, sir, it does. 
xovan en Court Reporter 74 
